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Imprecise Probabilities and Unstable Betting Behaviour1 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Many have argued that a rational agent's attitude towards a proposition may be better 
represented by a probability range than by a single number. I show that in such cases an 
agent will have unstable betting behaviour, and so will behave in an unpredictable way. I use 
this point to argue against a range of responses to the 'two bets' argument for sharp 
probabilities.  
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
Are subjective probabilities always precise? Plausibly we have some precise probabilities: to take the 
sort of clean case you might find in a probability textbook, your probability that a fair coin will land 
heads on its next toss is presumably precisely 0.5. But once we turn our attention to a wider class of 
claims, then the idea that our subjective probabilities are always precise seems implausible. What is 
your probability, for example, that (R) it will rain at midday in London on New Year's Day 2025? 
Perhaps you are neither very confident that it will rain, nor very confident that it won't, in which 
case your probability should be somewhere around 0.5. But what exactly is your probability in R? Is 
it, for example, 0.424? Or is it very slightly higher - say 0.425? You might be able to state a number if 
pressed - but the number you state will be arbitrary: you won't know that this is your probability in 
R.2 Furthermore, it is not clear what could possibly make it the case that your probability is one 
particular number (say, 0.424) rather than another (say, 0.425). Many theorists have responded to 
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 You might produce the number '0.5', and feel that this is not an arbitrary choice because it lies exactly 
between 0 and 1. To see a problem with this response, consider the claim (R
+
) that it will rain at midday and at 
11.50am in London on New Year's day 2025. Your probability in R
+
 will presumably be lower than your 
probability in R, so you can't have a probability of 0.5 in both claims. What, then, are your probabilities in 
these two claims? 
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this sort of case by claiming that subjective probabilities - even the subjective probabilities of 
rational agents - need not be precise. On one prominent version of this thought (defended by Levi 
1974, Jeffrey 1983, van Fraassen 1990, Bradley 2009 and Joyce 2011, and amongst others) a person's 
doxastic state is better represented by a set of probability functions, rather than by one unique 
probability function. Your probability in a particular claim can then be thought of as a range (the 
range of numbers that the probability functions in your set assign to that claim) rather than a single 
number. Thus subjective probabilities need not be sharp.  
 
The claim that rational agents may have imprecise subjective probabilities has faced a variety of 
objections. In this paper I focus on an objection concerning sequential choice. The problems that 
advocates of imprecise probabilities face in cases of sequential choice have been discussed in the 
literature from both economics and philosophy.3 Here I will focus on one particular version of this 
objection – the 'two-bets argument', recently championed by Adam Elga (Elga 2010)  – though many 
of the points that I make will also apply to other sequence based arguments for sharpness.4 Elga's 
argument has attracted plenty of interest, and there has been a recent frenzy of papers pushing a 
particular sort of objection: the key thought is that Elga has overlooked both a range of sophisticated 
decision rules and the resources of game theory, and that once these are taken into account the 
argument does not go through. This point has been made in different forms by Teddy Seidenfeld, 
Nils-Eric Sahlin and Paul Weirich (Sahlin & Weirich, 2012), Jake Chandler (Chandler, 2014), Katie 
Steele and Seamus Bradley (Bradley & Steele, 2014).5 Elga in his errata (Elga, 2012) addresses 
Seidenfeld’s version of this objection, and his come-back is to gesture towards some of the short-
falls of the particular decision rule that Seidenfeld has in mind. However, this response will only 
work against that particular version of the objection: the objection can be made in a similar form 
using a wide range of different decision rules - a range which is still proliferating. To respond to 
every version of the objection in a similar way, a champion of the two-bets argument would need to 
counteract each decision rule as it is put forward. In this paper I offer a simple powerful response 
that should allow us to dismiss all versions of this objection to the two-bets argument at a stroke. I 
argue that an agent with an imprecise subjective probability will display unstable betting behaviour, 
and this fact is at odds with the common strategy of these objectors. You can see my work in this 
paper as a giving a strengthened version of the two-bets argument which is immune to a range of 
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objections. I believe that there may yet be a response even to this strengthened version (and so a 
defense of imprecise subjective probabilities) - but this does not come cheap.   
 
I begin in the next section by setting out Elga's version of the two-bets argument against imprecise 
subjective probabilities.  
 
Section 2: The two-bets argument 
 
Suppose that you have an imprecise probability in claim R. We can suppose that your probability in R 
is the range [0.1-0.8]: the exact numbers do not matter here, as the discussion below can be 
adjusted to apply to any range you like. Now for the two-bets argument. You are offered the 
following 'great series of bets' (Elga, 2010, p. 4) - great because taken together they guarantee you a 
profit:  
 
Bet A: If R is true, you lose $10; otherwise, you win $15. 
Bet B: If R is true, you win $15; otherwise, you lose $10. 
 
You know that you will be offered both bets in succession, and that nothing significant will happen 
between your being offered bet A and your being offered bet B - i.e. you will not gain any evidence, 
or have any great insight, or change in any other relevant way. You value money linearly (assume 
that $1 is one utile), and let's assume that there is nothing else that you value of any relevance for 
this scenario. Elga argues that an agent who rejected both bets would be irrational. After all, why 
reject both bets, ensuring that you win nothing, when you could accept both bets and make a 
certain $5? I agree with Elga that to reject both bets would be irrational - and notice that no 
argument is required here, nor any special technical sense of 'irrational'. Rejecting both bets would 
just be a stupid thing to do - not something that you would do, for example.6  
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an agent who rejected both bets (or the equivalent in her scenarios) would be irrational. She argues that these 
cases are the ones where we judge that the agent 'genuinely changes her mind between bets' (Moss, 2014, p. 
15), and there are some features that typically obtain in these cases - such as a significant amount of time 
passing between the two bets being offered, and evidence of 'psychological effort'  (Moss, 2014, p. 15). I find 
this persuasive, and grant Moss's point. The two-bets scenario can still be constructed, however: we simply 
build into the scenario (as Elga did) that the bets are offered in close succession, and we ensure that the claim 
over which the bet is made is hardly worth agonizing over. In other words, we construct the scenario in such a 
way that none of the features typical of cases where an agent 'genuinely changes her mind' obtain. In this 
scenario - even by Moss's own lights - an agent who rejected both bets would be intuitively classed as 
irrational. 
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We can grant then that rejecting both bets would be irrational. But which of the two bets are you 
rationally required to accept? If you had a precise probability (x) in R, then there would be an 
obvious way to answer this question. You ought, rationally, to carry out actions which maximize 
expected utility.7 Should you then accept or reject bet A? The expected utility of accepting bet A is (-
10x + 15(1-x)) = 15 - 25x, and the expected utility of rejecting bet A is 0. Thus if x <3/5, then you 
should accept A; if x>3/5, then you should reject A; and if x=3/5, then you are rationally permitted to 
either accept or reject A. Should you accept or reject bet B? The expected utility of accepting bet B is 
(15x - 10(1-x)) = 25x - 10, and the expected utility of rejecting bet B is 0. Thus if x>2/5, then you 
should accept bet B; if x<2/5, then you should reject bet B; and if x=2/5, then you are rationally 
permitted to either accept or reject B. We can see then that whatever your probability in R, you are 
rationally required to accept at least one bet: if x<3/5, then you are rationally required to accept bet 
A; and if x>2/5, then you are rationally required to accept bet B; and of course x (i.e. your probability 
in R) must be either less than 3/5, or greater than 2/5 (or both).   
 
But what should you do if you have an imprecise probability in R? In particular, what should you do if 
your probability in R is the range [0.1 - 0.8]? What do the rules of rationality dictate here? Where 
probabilities are sharp, we have the rule 'maximize expected utility', which constrains the actions 
that can rationally be taken by the agent. What is the equivalent where probabilities are imprecise? 
As Elga writes, 'Anyone who claims that [rational] agents can have unsharp probability functions 
owes a corresponding account of how unsharp probabilities constrain rational action' (Elga, 2010, p. 
3). Elga then explores a number of possible ways of meeting this challenge, and finds that each is 
inadequate. Throughout, this compelling claim is taken for granted: it would be irrational to reject 
both bets. Thus any attempt to state the 'rules that constrain rational action' will be judged 
incomplete unless they entail that it is irrational to reject both bets.  
 
We can immediately eliminate any 'permissive choice' rules according to which it is rationally 
permitted to either accept or reject the first bet, and then (regardless of your choice over bet A) 
rationally permitted to either accept or reject the second bet. The underlying idea behind these 
permissive choice rules is this: an action is rationally permitted provided that it maximises expected 
utility relative to some probability function in the set that represents your doxastic state. On this 
view, you are rationally permitted to accept bet A, because for some probability functions in your 
range - such as that which assigns 0.1 to claim R - the expected utility of accepting A (((-
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10)(0.1)+(15)(0.9))=12.5, where R is assigned 0.1) is higher than the expected utility of rejecting A (0 
for all probability functions). You are also rationally permitted to reject A, because for some 
probabilities in your range - such as that which assigns 0.8 to R - the expected utility of accepting A 
(((-10)(0.8)+(15)(0.2))=-5, where R is assigned 0.8) is lower than the expected utility of rejecting A. 
Similar reasoning shows that you are also rationally permitted to either accept or reject bet B. Thus 
on this view you are rationally permitted to accept or reject either bet - and in particular you are 
rationally permitted to reject both bets. This violates the compelling claim that no rational agent 
would reject both of these bets, and thus it seems we can eliminate all 'permissive choice rules'. 
 
Good objections can be raised to a host of other candidate rules for rationality. Elga rejects the 'mid-
point rule' - that if rational you will act as though you had a sharp probability at the mid-point of 
your probability range - on the grounds that this 'robs unsharp probabilities of their point' (Elga, 
2010, p. 6). Elga rejects the 'narrowing proposal' - according to which your probability range in a 
claim should narrow in line with the actions that you take - on the grounds that it cannot be a 
rational requirement that your probability should change without a change in your evidence. He 
rejects the 'planning proposal' - according to which in the two-bets scenario a rational agent would 
make a plan and stick to it - on the grounds that it cannot be a brute rule of rationality that agents 
should stick to their plans.8 And finally Elga rejects the 'sequence proposal'9 - according to which an 
agent's choices throughout a sequence of bets must maximise expected utility relative to some 
probability function in the agent's range - on the grounds that this rule would have the consequence 
that an agent offered merely bet B may rationally refuse it, but an agent in the two-bet scenario who 
has refused bet A may not refuse bet B, even though the choice that the agent faces in these two 
situations are the same in every relevant respect.10 It seems then that the advocate of imprecise 
subjective probabilities has no good answer to the question 'how do unsharp probabilities constrain 
rational action?'. Without a good answer to this question, the defender of imprecise probabilities is 
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in an untenable position, and so it seems we must conclude that rational agents have only sharp 
probabilities.  
 
This argument has faced a barrage of criticism - including the prevalent objection that I focus on in 
this paper, raised by Seidenfeld, Sahlin & Weirich (2012), Bradley and Steele (2014) and Chandler 
(2014). These authors point to the range of sophisticated decision rules developed by imprecise 
probability theorists, and the resources of game theory: once these are taken into account (these 
authors claim), the two-bets argument no longer goes through. In the next section I run through a 
version of this point, before turning to my response in section 4.  
 
Section 3: The Objection to the Two-Bets Argument 
 
Imprecise theorists have developed various decision rules, including maximin (Gärdenfors & Sahlin 
1982 and others), maximax (Satia & Lave, 1973), Ellsberg's rule (Ellsberg, 1961) and Hurwicz's 
criterion (Arrow & Hurwicz, 1972). Elga does not focus on these rules in his 2010 paper,11 so let us 
consider how these rules fare in his two-bets scenario, taking maximin as our focus.  
 
The rule maximin works as follows. An agent's doxastic state is represented by a set of precise 
probability functions, and when considering a possible action, there is an expected utility for that 
action relative to each precise probability function in the agent's set. Amongst these expected 
utilities for the action, one will be the lowest - and so each action has a minimum expected utility. 
According to maximin, when faced with a choice, a rational agent will carry out whichever action has 
the maximum minimum expected utility.  
 
To see maximin in action, suppose first that you are presented with just bet A: if R is true, you lose 
$10; otherwise, you win $15. Suppose as before that your subjective probability in R is the range 
[0.1-0.8]: in other words, your probability function is a set of precise probabilities which between 
them assign all numbers in the range [0.1 - 0.8] to claim R. Accepting bet A has an expected utility 
relative to each of these precise probabilities. For example, the probability that assigns 0.1 to claim 
R, gives the act of accepting bet A an expected utility of ((0.1)(-10) + (0.9)(15)) = 12.5; the probability 
that assigns 0.5 to claim R gives the act of accepting bet A an expected utility of (0.5)(-10) + (0.5)(15) 
= 2.5. The probability that gives the lowest expected utility to the act of accepting bet A is the 
                                                 
11
 Elga discusses maximin in a footnote ( (Elga, 2010, p. 5), where he claims that maximin is effectively a 
permissive choice rule. However in his errata (Elga, 2012, p. 1) Elga corrects this claim, and considers a version 
of the prevalent objection that we are concerned with here.  
7 
 
probability that assigns 0.8 to claim R: this gives the act of accepting bet A an expected utility of 
(0.8)(-10) + (0.2)(15) = -5. Thus the minimum expected utility of accepting bet A is -5. The expected 
utility of rejecting bet A is the same for each probability function: it is simply 0. Thus the minimum 
expected utility of accepting bet A (i.e. -5) is lower than the minimum expected utility of rejecting 
bet A (i.e. 0), and so maximin rules that if you are rational you will reject bet A - for this is the act 
with the maximum minimum expected utility. We can use similar reasoning to show that the 
maximin rule requires you to reject bet B if offered in isolation: the expected utility of accepting bet 
B will be at its lowest when we take the probability of R to be 0.1, and so the minimum expected 
utility of accepting the bet is (0.1)(15) + (0.9)(-10) = -7.5, and this is less than the minimum expected 
utility of rejecting bet B (i.e. 0). It may be tempting then to assume that the maximin rule requires 
you to reject both bets in the two-bets scenario - and so that the maximin rule conflicts with the 
plausible claim that an agent who rejects both bets is irrational.  
 
But in fact, as Bradley & Steele (2014), Chandler (2014), Sahlin & Weirich (2012) and Seidenfeld have 
all pointed out - and as Elga has conceded (Elga, 2012, p. 1) - an agent who is obeying the maximin 
rule will not reject both bets.12 To see why this is, we need to think about the two-bets scenario like 
a game theorist. In the two-bets scenario you know before you are offered bet A that you will also 
be offered bet B. You also know that nothing significant will have changed between your being 
offered bet A and your being offered bet B. Thus if your behaviour is in line with maximin when you 
are offered bet A, then it will also be in line with maximin when you are offered bet B. If we suppose 
that you know from the start that your behaviour will be in line with maximin throughout, and you 
also know your preferences and doxastic state, then at the time when you are offered bet A you can 
figure out how you will choose when faced with bet B.  Whether you accept or reject bet B will 
depend on the minimum expected utilities of these two actions, which are laid out in the table 
below:  
 
 Minimum Expected Utility 
If A has already been accepted 
Accept B 5 
Reject B (leaving yourself 
exposed to just bet A) 
(0.8)(-10)+(0.2)(15) = -8+3 = -5 
If A has already been rejected 
Accept B (0.1)(15)+(0.9)(-10) = 1.5-9 = -7.5 
Reject B 0 
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You can see then that if bet A is accepted, then bet B will also be accepted (because 5>-5), and if bet 
A is rejected then bet B will also be rejected (because 0>-7.5). You can figure all of this out before 
you are offered bet A, and so when deciding whether to accept bet A, you do so with the knowledge 
that if you accept bet A you will end up accepting both bets, and if you reject bet A you will end up 
rejecting both bets. Thus you are effectively deciding whether to accept both bets (with a minimum 
expected utility of 5), or to accept neither bet (with a minimum expected utility of 0). Given that you 
should carry out the act with the maximum minimum expected utility, you should accept bet A. Thus 
maximin rules that a rational agent (who has a probability range of [0.1 - 0.8] in R, and who values 
only money, and values it linearly) will end up accepting both bets. It seems then that the imprecise 
probability theorist can answer the challenge to produce a plausible rule for rational action that 
gives an acceptable result in the two-bets scenario. 
 
Notice here that the maximin rule requires that you accept bet B once bet A has been offered and 
accepted, but that you reject bet B if is offered in isolation. Similarly maximin requires you to accept 
bet A if you know that bet B will also be offered, but to reject bet A if it is offered in isolation. It 
might seem then that maximin should face the sorts of objection that Elga levels at the sequence 
proposal. According to the sequence proposal, you are rationally permitted to reject bet B if offered 
in isolation, but not rationally permitted to reject bet B if you have already rejected bet A - for this 
would be an irrational sequence of actions. In objection to this proposal, Elga protests that 
rationality can't impose different requirements on you in these two cases, since in each case you 
'[face] choices that are exactly the same in every respect that [you care] about' (Elga, 2010, p. 8). 
This seems like a strong objection to the sequence proposal: can a similar objection against the 
maximin rule carry the same force? Here we might compare two cases: in one case you are offered 
bet B in isolation; in the other case, you are in the two-bets scenario, have just accepted bet A, and 
are now being offered bet B. Maximin rules (assuming as usual that your probability in R is the range 
[0.1 - 0.8]) that B should be rejected in the first case and accepted in the second case. Do you in 
these two cases face choices that are exactly the same in every respect that you care about? No: you 
care about minimizing expected utility, and the minimum expected utility of the actions available to 
you are different in the two cases. Intuitively, accepting B in the first case is risky (with a minimum 
expected utility of -7.5) whereas accepting B in the second case is safely profitable (with a minimum 
expected utility of 5). Similarly maximin rules that if you are offered bet A in isolation you should 
reject it, but if you are offered bet A knowing that bet B will also be offered, you should accept A. 
Again, these scenarios are different in some respect that you care about: accepting A in isolation is 
risky (with a minimum expected utility of -5), but accepting A knowing that you will shortly accept 
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bet B is safe (with a minimum expected utility of 5). Thus the objection that Elga levels against the 
sequence proposal cannot be applied to maximin.   
 
Here it might be objected that we have not given the permissive choice rules a fair trial. When 
considering maximin, we assumed that when faced with bet B, you would take into account the 
choice already made over bet A, and we treated the utilities as cumulative. Furthermore, we 
assumed that when faced with bet A, you would take into account what choice you will make over 
bet B. What happens if we give the permissive choice rules the same treatment? We can start by 
figuring out whether you would accept bet B taking into account your earlier choice over bet A: 
 
 Expected utility, relative to the probability 
function that assigns x to claim R.  
If A has already been accepted 
Accept B 5 
Reject B (x)(-10)+(1-x)(15) 
If A has already been rejected 
Accept B (x)(15)+(1-x)(-10) 
Reject B 0 
 
Your doxastic state is represented by a range of probability functions, which between them assign R 
every number in the range [0.1 - 0.8]. Relative to some of these probability functions (e.g. that which 
assigns 0.8 to claim R), the expected utility, once A has already been accepted, of accepting bet B (5) 
is higher than the expected utility of rejecting bet B (((0.8)(-10) + (0.2)(15)) = -5). Relative to some 
other probability functions (e.g. that which assigns 0.1 to claim R) the expected utility of rejecting 
bet B (((0.1)(-10) + (0.9)(15)) = 12.5) is higher. Thus (according to the permissive choice rules) you 
may rationally accept or reject bet B once bet A has already been accepted. We can show similarly 
that you may either accept or reject B once A has already been rejected. Thus when considering 
whether to accept or reject bet A, you will not know whether you will subsequently accept or reject 
B. At least, you cannot figure this out from knowing your own probabilities and preferences, 
knowing that you are rational, and knowing that rational agents adhere to the permissive choice 
rules.  
 
Thus the prevalent response to the two-bets argument cannot be made using the permissive choice 
rules rather than maximin.  The advantage of maximin for these purposes is that it determines how 
you will respond to bet B: thus if you know that you are rational, and that rational agents adhere to 
maximin, and if you know your own probabilities and preferences, then at the point where you are 
10 
 
deciding whether to accept bet A, you will be able to predict whether or not you will accept bet B 
(dependent on your decision to accept or reject bet A). This means that when deciding whether to 
accept bet A, you are effectively deciding between different action-bundles: you are choosing 
between accepting both A and B (for you know that if you accept A then you will also accept B), and 
rejecting both A and B (for you know that if you reject A then you will also reject B). Maximin rules in 
favour of accepting both bets - and so maximin can handle the two-bets scenario. Maximin is not the 
only rule that can handle the scenario in this sort of way: versions of the same argument can be 
given using maximax, Hurwicz's rule and others. What the rules have in common is that they are not 
permissive: they settle how the agent (if rational) will act - given the agent's preferences, doxastic 
state, and in some cases another measure such as the agent's optimism quotient.13  
 
Thus we seem to have a strategy for responding to the two-bets argument, and that strategy works 
with a wide range of rules of rationality. One way a champion of the two-bets argument could 
respond would be to shoot down these rules one by one, and this is indeed how Elga responds in his 
errata to the objection as raised by Seidenfeld - by pointing out a problem with maximin (Elga, 2012, 
p. 1). But Elga's strategy is problematic: firstly, because any problems with the individual rules must 
be weighed against the problems with the alternative - i.e. the counterintuitive claim that all 
subjective probabilities are sharp; and secondly because we can see how new more complex rules 
broadly along the same lines may yet be developed - and so finding objections to each one may 
prove a never-ending task.  
 
I propose instead to object to the strategy itself. An essential part of the strategy is the claim that 
your decisions are rationally determined (given your doxastic state and so on), and so that your 
decisions are predictable. This is what makes it possible for you to approach the two-bets scenario as 
a game theorist: you can figure out which actions you will go on to take, and so you are effectively 
comparing bundles of actions from the start. I argue in the next section that this ability to predict 
your own actions is typically missing in cases where your subjective probabilities are imprecise.  
 
Section 4: Unstable Betting Behaviour 
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Let's start by thinking again about claim R (the claim that it will rain in London on New Year's Day 
2025). This serves as an example of a claim in which - intuitively - you have an imprecise probability. 
If you don't think it serves this purpose, then just replace throughout with some claim that does: all 
parties can agree that there are some claims in which you seem to have an imprecise probability 
rather than a precise probability. Now let's think about your betting behaviour - which bets you 
would accept and reject - concerning R. Take bets of this form: 
 
D: You pay $v, and you get $1 back iff R.  
 
Perhaps for some v, it will be obvious for you whether to accept or reject the bet. So perhaps you 
would gladly accept the bet where v = 0.01, and would reject the bet out of hand for v=0.99. But for 
some v you may be unsure what to do. Perhaps for v = 0.45, for example, you waver. If pushed to 
make a decision, you may be able to do so, but your decision will have an arbitrary flavor. If you 
decide to accept the bet, for example, then you could easily have decided instead to reject it: though 
you accept the bet in the actual world, in a close possible world where you have all the same 
evidence and the same preferences as in the actual world, you instead reject the bet.  
 
I claim that this sort of 'instability' in an agent's betting behaviour is typical of cases where intuitively 
we class an agent as having an imprecise probability.14 For contrast, consider a case where R is some 
claim in which you have a precise probability: say that R is the claim that a particular coin that you 
know to be fair will land heads on its next toss. In this case your probability in R is precisely 0.5. If 
you are offered a bet of the form D, then whenever v is less than 0.5 you will accept the bet - and 
you will do so reliably: you will accept the bet in any close possible world where you have the same 
evidence and the same preferences.15 Similarly whenever v is greater than 0.5, you will reliably 
reject the bet. It is only when v is exactly 0.5 that your betting behaviour is unstable: you might 
accept the bet or you might reject it - but you will do so on a whim and there will be relevant close 
                                                 
14
 I hold off from saying that this sort of instability is a necessary ingredient for cases where (intuitively) agents 
have imprecise subjective probabilities, because there may be cases where an agent deliberately regulates her 
choices in some way whenever evidence (plus preferences) does not dictate her choice. For example, we can 
imagine an agent who accepts or rejects bets as her evidence and preferences rationally dictate, and in un-
dictated cases always accepts. Of course, her decision to accept must be arbitrary - i.e. not dictated by her 
evidence and preferences: we shouldn't imagine here an agent who on the whole enjoys accepting offers more 
than rejecting them (perhaps out of politeness) - because this preference should have played its role along 
with the agent's evidence in rationally dictating her choice. We must instead imagine an agent who has chosen 
arbitrarily to follow this rule. If such a case is possible, then we have a case where the agent's betting 
behaviour is arbitrary - and not dictated by her evidence and preferences - but nevertheless is stable. It is 
because of the possibility of this sort of case that I say that unstable betting behaviour is a typical (rather than 
necessary) feature of cases where intuitively we claim that an agent has an imprecise subjective probability.  
15
 We are still assuming here that you value only money, and value money linearly.  
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possible worlds where you make a different choice. Where your probability in R is precise, then, 
unstable betting behaviour over a bet like D narrows to a point; where your probability in R is 
imprecise, unstable betting behaviour over a bet like D extends to a range corresponding to the 
range of numbers assigned to claim R by the probabilities in the set that represents your doxastic 
attitude. Thus in a case where your subjective probability in R is the range [0.1 - 0.8], you will reliably 
accept bet D for any v<0.1, and you will reliably reject bet D for any v>0.8, but for v such that 
0.1v0.8, your betting behaviour over bet D will be unstable: that is, there will be close possible 
worlds where you have your actual evidence and preferences where you accept the bet, and close 
possible worlds where you have your actual evidence and preferences where you reject the bet.  
 
As an analogy, compare this case: you are briefly shown a large jar, filled to the brim with sweets. 
You are asked a question of form E, and told that if you give the right answer then you will win the 
jar of sweets: 
 
E: Are there at least v sweets in the jar? 
 
Perhaps where v=1, you will confidently answer 'yes', and for v=1000,000 you will confidently 
answer 'no' But for some v (perhaps for v=150) you waver. Given the strong incentive to be in with a 
chance of winning the sweets, you will manage to cough up an answer, but the answer you give will 
be arbitrary. You will decide by tossing a coin, perhaps, or consulting your 'feelings', or you will allow 
yourself to be swayed by some irrelevant feature of your environment. The coin toss, your feelings, 
and the feature of the environment could all easily have turned out otherwise - in which case you 
would have given a different answer. Your behaviour here is unstable: if you say 'yes' in the actual 
world, then there is some close possible world where you have all the same evidence and 
preferences, but say no.16  
 
                                                 
16
 This is a case of 'inexact knowledge' (Williamson, 1994, pp. 216-234). If we suppose that there are in fact w 
sweets in the jar, then you know that there are at least v sweets only if v is smaller than w by some margin (the 
'margin for error'). Williamson argues that you do not know that there are at least v sweets where v is within 
the margin for error, because there are close possible worlds where your belief is false. There are (at least) two 
ways that your belief might be false in a close possible world: you might have a belief with the same content as 
in the actual world, even though the number of sweets in the jar is different; or you might have a belief with a 
different content (you might easily have believed otherwise), despite the number of sweets in the jar being the 
same. Williamson discusses both sorts of cases, but it is the second sort of case that is most relevant to this 
paper. To bring out the relevance, replace 'believes' with 'guesses': where v is within the margin for error, an 
agent who guesses that there are at least v sweets in the jar could easily have guessed otherwise - and so (in 
other words) there will be close possible worlds where the agent does guess otherwise.   
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Where behaviour is unstable, it is hard to predict. In the sweet jar example, with v=150, an onlooker 
would have a hard time predicting how you would answer the question: this holds even if the 
onlooker knows exactly what evidence you have (e.g. perhaps (s)he shares your evidence and knows 
it), and knows how much you would like to win the prize. You yourself don't have enough 
information to predict how you will respond: you might resolve to respond a particular way, but that 
is a different matter. Similarly, to return to bet D, if you are offered a bet of this form with v falling 
somewhere within your subjective probability range [0.1 - 0.8], an onlooker - even one who knew 
about your evidence and preferences - may be unable to predict how you would respond. For you 
will just decide on a whim: perhaps you will toss a coin, or be influenced by some apparently 
irrelevant feature of your environment, or consult your feelings. Given that your decision can be 
swayed by such insignificant things, without knowing all of these factors  - the outcome of the coin 
toss, the details of your environment, your biochemistry, and exactly how these factors will 
determine your decision - neither you nor an outside observer could reliably predict your betting 
behavior.17  
 
The problem is that the prevalent strategy for responding to the two-bets argument relies on the 
assumption that you can predict your own betting behaviour. For a key move in the strategy is to 
think about the problem like a game theorist: we assume that at the point when you are offered bet 
A, you will be able to think ahead and figure out whether (depending on whether you accept bet A) 
you will accept bet B. But this assumption is unrealistic. In the cases we are interested in - the cases 
where intuitively subjective probabilities are imprecise - betting behaviour is typically unstable and 
so unpredictable. 
 
To see the problem here, let us focus on the question of whether you would accept bet B, having 
already rejected bet A. If you have rejected bet A, then you have a choice between accepting bet B 
(paying out $10, and getting $25 back (i.e. winning $15) if R is true), and rejecting bet B (losing and 
gaining nothing). Given that you value only money and value it linearly, we would expect your 
betting behaviour over this bet to be like that over a bet of the form D with v = 2/5 (i.e. you pay out 
$2/5, and get $1 back iff R). As v here is within your probability range for R ([0.1 - 0.8]), we would 
expect your betting behaviour over this D-form bet to be unstable and therefore unpredictable. Thus 
                                                 
17
 Perhaps you could discover all the relevant factors: I don't mean to argue that it is in principle impossible to 
predict your own or others' betting behaviour. The key point is just that in every day cases of the relevant sort 
you typically cannot make these predictions, perhaps partly because you just do not have a brain scanner to 
hand. What holds of the everyday cases holds of the two-bets scenario too: you do not have a brain scanner to 
hand in that scenario either. If you are able to make the relevant predictions in the two-bets scenario but not 
in everyday cases, this demands an explanation. 
14 
 
we would expect your betting behaviour over bet B - once you have rejected A - to similarly be 
unstable. As unstable betting behaviour is unpredictable, it would follow that you are unable to 
predict from the start of the sequence how you will respond to bet B if you reject bet A. Similar 
reasoning would show that your betting behaviour over B is unstable if you accept (rather than 
reject) bet A. Thus the prevalent strategy cannot be applied: we cannot use game theory to handle 
the two-bets scenario in the way that has been proposed.  
 
Here a natural objection is that your betting behaviour would not be unstable or unpredictable in 
the two-bets scenario. After all, any rational agent (and you are hardly going to be deliberately 
irrational!) would not reject both bets. I heartily agree - but this is the very mystery that we are 
grappling with. The dialectic here is complicated, so I will pause to spell it out. We began with the 
uncontroversial piece of data that there are lots of everyday cases where people - ordinary, 
generally intelligent people, people who are 'rational' at least in the everyday sense - don’t seem to 
have sharp probabilities, but perhaps have imprecise probabilities instead. An example is the case 
that I began with: your probability that (R) it will rain at midday on London in 2025. I claim that a 
mark of these sorts of cases is that the agent in question would display unstable betting behaviour 
across a range of bets - e.g. across bets of the form D with a range of values for v. That this unstable 
betting behaviour is at least a mark of these cases seems undeniable: after all, what motivation 
would we have for saying that an agent seems to lack sharp probabilities, if his or her betting 
behaviour was perfectly stable? Then the challenge is to handle the two-bets scenario. In this 
scenario, a rational agent ('rational' in the everyday sense - an ordinary, generally intelligent person 
such as yourself) would not reject both bets. How can this be explained? The prevalent response is 
to claim that rational agents act in line with some rule such as maximin, and further that they know 
they are doing so, and so can predict their future behaviour. If this is correct, then (as the advocates 
of this view have shown) a rational agent would not reject both bets in the two-bets scenario.  There 
is no need (the advocates say) to rely on the moves that Elga argues against in his 2010 paper, such 
as the midpoint rule, or the planning proposal, or the sequence proposal. The sophisticated decision 
rule (e.g. maximin) together with game theory already has all the resources needed to explain why a 
rational agent will not reject both bets. The problem for this approach, of course, is that it relies on a 
false assumption: that even in cases where intuitively a rational agent has imprecise probabilities, 
that agent's betting behaviour is in line with some rule, and so is stable and therefore predictable. 
The very phenomena that we began with - and that advocates of the prevalent response to the two-
bets argument want to uphold - is mischaracterized by this approach. Thus the prevalent response 
to the two-bets argument does not work.  
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It may seem as though my argument here has far-reaching (perhaps implausibly far-reaching) 
consequences. Given that I claim that the mark of an agent with imprecise probabilities is unstable 
betting behaviour across a range of bets (e.g. across bets of the form D with a range of values for v), 
does it follow that we should reject maximin altogether - and also maximax, the Ellsberg Rule, the 
Hurwicz criterion, and countless other sophisticated decision rules? After all, these rules prescribe 
how an agent should act  - given that agent's doxastic state, preferences, and perhaps his or her 
optimism quotient or similar. While these remain fixed across close possible worlds, presumably the 
agent's behaviour will be stable - at least if the agent is rational. So don't all of these rules 
misrepresent the phenomena that we are interested in? The theorists who develop these rules of 
course think that a rational agent can have imprecise probabilities (otherwise they would not be 
motivated to develop the rules), but if we take instability of betting behaviour as a mark of an 
agent's having imprecise probabilities, then we have a problem - because these rules seem to leave 
no room for a rational agent's displaying unstable betting behaviour. I think that this thought is well 
worth pursuing, but in this paper I do not attempt to develop my point in this direction. After all, 
there are plenty of ways that advocates of sophisticated decision rules for imprecise probabilities 
might respond: they might say that there is no assumption that an agent's doxastic state, or 
preferences, or level of optimism will be stable in typical cases of imprecise probabilities; or they 
might point out that the agent's doxastic state is vague, so often no particular actions are 
determinately prescribed; or they might claim that the rules were only supposed to model rational 
behaviour, and should not be taken too literally. The problem that concerns us in this paper is that 
on the prevalent response to the two-bets argument the rules are taken literally, and the doxastic 
state, preferences and level of optimism are assumed to be determinate and stable. It is only if we 
take this view that we get a response to the two-bets argument: it is crucial that the agent knows, at 
the time when (s)he is offered bet A, how she will act when offered bet B, and this is not guaranteed 
if the agent's doxastic state is supposed to be unstable, or vague, or if the relevant rule for 
rationality (e.g. maximin) is a mere model to which rational agents need not literally conform. Thus 
while there may be various ways of reconciling rules such as maximin with the fact that where 
probabilities are imprecise, betting behaviour is unstable, there is no way of reconciling the 
prevalent response to the two-bets argument with this fact.  
 
I have argued, then, that the prevalent response to the two-bets challenge is unsuccessful. In the 
next section, I suggest a strengthened form of the two-bets argument, and consider whether any 
attempts to refute the original argument could work against this strengthened form.  
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Section 5: The Two-Bets Argument Strengthened 
 
I have claimed that unstable betting behaviour is a mark of imprecise probabilities. To be more 
precise, my claim is that where an agent has a probability [m, n] in some claim R, then that agent's 
betting behaviour will typically be unstable across all bets of the form D, where m<v<n (assuming as 
usual that the agent values only money, and values money linearly). And of course an agent will 
display similarly unstable betting behaviour across all bets which the agent would deem relevantly 
equivalent. With this in mind, we can now give a strengthened version of the two bets argument 
against imprecise probabilities. The challenge is to produce a rule that guides rational action, with 
the following features: 
 
1.  The rule respects the fact that where probabilities are imprecise, betting behaviour is typically 
unstable, in the sense described above. To fail to respect this would be to '[rob] unsharp 
probabilities of their point' - which is the accusation that Elga reasonably levels against the 
mid-point view (Elga, Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp, 2010, p. 6).  
 
2.  The rule entails that an agent in the two-bets scenario18 who rejects both bets is irrational.  
 
We can see that the prevalent objection fails to meet this strengthened challenge. To ensure that 
the second requirement is met, the proponents of this view claim that the agent if rational will be 
acting in line with some sophisticated decision rule - such as maximin. And the idea is not merely 
that the decision rule is modelling the agent's behaviour: the agent's behaviour is literally described 
by the model. Further, the agent's doxastic state and preferences are stable and known, so the agent 
is able to accurately predict his or her own future behaviour. All of this is required if the rule is to 
entail that an agent who rejects both bets is irrational. But in meeting this second requirement, the 
proponents violate the first requirement: the solution mischaracterizes the phenomenon that it was 
designed to defend.  
 
We can see that the permissive choice rules obviously violate the second requirement. And so we 
are left with the midpoint rule, the narrowing proposal, the sequence proposal and the planning 
proposal. Elga gives independent rules for rejecting each of these rules, but it is worth noting here 
how each rule fares with respect to requirements 1 and 2 above. The midpoint rule clearly violates 
                                                 
18
 Here as before we construct the two-bets scenario in such a way that even on Moss's view an agent who 
rejected both bets would be deemed irrational. See footnote 6.  
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requirement 1. The narrowing proposal and the sequence proposal do not strictly violate 
requirement 1, but they do violate a natural extension of this requirement, which I turn to now.  
 
I defined 'unstable betting behaviour' as betting behaviour that varies across close possible worlds, 
where the agent has the same evidence and preferences. Where betting behaviour varies in this way 
across close possible worlds, I claim that typically it will similarly vary within the same possible world 
across time - provided that the (relevant) evidence and preferences are unchanged. To illustrate the 
point here, suppose as usual that your probability in R is the range [0.1 - 0.8], that you value money 
linearly, and so on. At ten o'clock a bookie approaches you with two bets of the form D, one (D0.5) 
with v=0.5, and one (D0.51) with v=0.51: both bets are offered simultaneously, and you are free to 
accept or reject either or both of them. You decide which bets to accept, on a whim. Then, five 
minutes later, the bookie comes back to you full of apologies: the betting slips have blown away, and 
all bets made at 10 o'clock are called off. You are offered bets D0.5 and D0.51 once again, and you're 
free to give the same or a different answer to your earlier response - the bookie cannot even 
remember it. I claim that you might accept both bets at ten o'clock, but reject both at five past ten - 
or vice versa. In other words, your betting behaviour is unstable across time. I claim that where 
probabilities are imprecise, betting behaviour (even the betting behaviour of rational agents) 
exhibits a similar same sort of instability across time as it does across possible worlds.  
 
We can then extend requirement 1 to include instability across time as well as across close possible 
worlds. If we do so, then we can see that the narrowing proposal violates this requirement. To see 
this, consider that according to the narrowing proposal, an agent who accepted bet D0.51 at 10 
o'clock (and so we can assume also accepted bet D0.5) would thereafter (at least, until (s)he gained 
some new evidence) have in the set that represents his or her doxastic state only probability 
functions relative to which the expected utility of accepting bet D0.51 is greater than - or at least 
equal to - the expected utility of rejecting bet D0.51. Thus relative to every probability function in the 
set that represents the agent's doxastic set from 10 o'clock onwards, the probability assigned to R is 
greater than or equal to 0.51. It would be irrational, then, for the agent at five past ten to reject bet 
D0.5 - when relative to every probability function in the set representing the agent's doxastic state, 
accepting bet D0.5 has a higher expected utility than rejecting it.  
 
Do the sequence and planning proposals similarly violate the first requirement, once it is extended 
to cover temporal as well as modal instability? Here the proponent of the sequence proposal might 
make the following move: not just any series of actions counts as a 'sequence'. For a series of actions 
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to count as a sequence, some special features must hold: e.g. perhaps the agent must suspect that 
(s)he will carry out this sequence, or perhaps (s)he must see the individual actions as in some sense 
part of a coherent larger action.19 In general, where probabilities are imprecise, betting behaviour is 
unstable as described above across both possible worlds and time: thus requirement 1 is satisfied. 
However in the special case where a series of actions qualifies as a 'sequence', the agent (if rational) 
will not exhibit this sort of instability across time (though (s)he will still exhibit it across possible 
worlds). Instead, there will be at least one probability function in the set representing the agent's 
doxastic state, relative to which every action taken in the series maximizes expected utility. The 
series of bets in the two-bets scenario qualifies as a sequence: that is why a rational agent will not 
reject both bets. The scenario described above involving bets D0.5 and D0.51 is not a sequence, and 
this explains why a rational agent might accept both bets at the earlier time and then reject both at 
the later time. Thus the sequence proposal may be able to satisfy both requirements 1 and 2.  
 
The proponent of the planning proposal can make a similar move. Rational agents are sometimes 
required to make plans and stick to them - but they are not required to plan for every possible 
eventuality. The two-bets scenario is a case where a rational agent is required to make a plan and 
stick to it. The plan must maximize expected utility relative to some probability function in the set 
that represents the agent's doxastic state - and no such plan will advocate rejecting both bets. This 
explains why it would be irrational to reject both bets in the two-bets scenario. However the 
example involving D0.5 and D0.51 is not a case where the agent is required to make a plan, and so the 
agent can be rational and yet exhibit unstable betting behaviour in this scenario. In general, agents 
with imprecise probabilities typically exhibit unstable betting behaviour across close possible worlds, 
and also across time – unless the case is one where the agent is rationally required to make a plan 
and stick to it. Thus the planning proposal may be able to satisfy both requirements 1 and 2.  
 
Of course, the sequence proposal and the planning proposal still face the problems that Elga raises 
against them (Elga, 2010). But I note here that they seem to work as well as responses to our 
strengthened version of the two-bets argument as they do to the original two-bets argument. We 
can see clearly now that the real challenge is to explain why it is that where subjective probabilities 
are (intuitively) imprecise, betting behaviour is typically unstable - but snaps into line in the two-bets 
scenario. Both the sequence proposal and the planning proposal have the right sort of shape to 
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 Jonathan Weisberg suggests that Elga slips between describing the agent's response to the bookie's offers of 
bets A and B as a single action, and as two separate actions (Weisberg, 2015, pp. 8-9). Analogously, a 
proponent of the sequence proposal might claim that Elga's argument plays on our uncertainty as to whether 
the agent's response to the pair of bets qualifies as a sequence. 
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respond to this challenge. Whether they are satisfactory depends on whether Elga's objections to 
these theories can be met, and the proponents of these solutions have arguments in defense of their 
positions which I do not pursue here. My aim has been to show that the sequence and planning 
proposals are as applicable to the strengthened version of the two-bets argument as they are to the 
original two bets argument - unlike the prevalent response that I have attacked in this paper.  
 
 
Section 6: Should Subjective Probabilities Be Sharp? 
 
I end by considering Elga's own view - that rational agents have only sharp probabilities. Does this 
work well as a response to the two-bets scenario? 
 
There are two ways that we might cash out the claim that 'subjective probabilities should be sharp'. 
We might claim that rational agents have sharp probabilities, without implying that this requires that 
betting behaviour should be stable. Or we might claim that rational agents have sharp probabilities, 
and further that sharp probabilities entail stable betting behaviour - and so conclude that rational 
agents always exhibit stable betting behaviour.20 I consider each of these options in turn.  
 
First of all, let us consider the idea that rational agents might have sharp probabilities even while 
exhibiting unstable betting behaviour. This might seem like an odd idea - for what could determine 
that an agent had some particular precise probability function while his or her betting behaviour is 
unstable? However there are a number of ways this idea could be cashed out. We could say that the 
precise probability is fixed somehow by the pattern of betting behaviour: perhaps the probability 
function is some sort of average of the agent's actual and dispositional betting behaviour, or perhaps 
the probability function supervenes on the betting behaviour in 'an unsurveyably chaotic way' 
(Williamson, 1994, p. 209). We could alternatively say that the agent's subjective probability is a 
functional state - and perhaps it will somehow turn out that this functional state is indeed a relation 
to a precise probability function. Or we could say that the precise probability function of an agent is 
fixed in some way by his or her brain state.21 Or perhaps we could say that the whole idea of an 
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 I note that even where an agent (intuitively) has sharp probabilities, that agent will still display unstable 
betting behaviour over bets that (s)he considers fair. E.g. an agent with a precise probability of y in R will 
display unstable betting behaviour over a bet of the form D with v=y. The real contrast then is between betting 
behaviour that is unstable over bets of the form D for a range of values v, and betting behaviour that is 
unstable over bets of the form D only for a unique value v: for simplicity however in this section I refer to these 
as 'unstable' and 'stable' betting behaviours respectively.  
21
 As Ramsey writes: 'it is, I suppose, conceivable that degrees of belief could be measured by a 
psychogalvanometer or some such instrument…' (Ramsey, 1926, p. 161).  
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agent's having a probability function should not be taken too literally: it is merely a way of modelling 
the agent's doxastic state, and so even an agent with unstable betting behaviour gets modelled by a 
precise probability function. Any of these ideas - and there may be others - might be used to cash 
out the idea that an agent can have a sharp probability function even while his or her betting 
behaviour is unstable.  
 
The claim that rational agents have sharp probability functions - when not saddled with the 
assumption that sharp probability functions entail stable betting behaviour - may be easy enough to 
swallow. On this view we can maintain that rational agents exhibit unstable betting behaviour, even 
while granting that rational agents have sharp probability functions. The problem however is that 
this view cannot handle the two-bets scenario. If rational agents have sharp probabilities, but sharp 
probabilities are no guarantee of stable betting behaviour, then (for all that has been said) rational 
agents may exhibit unstable betting behaviour. The fact that an agent who rejects both bets in the 
two-bets scenario is classed as irrational is then left unexplained. Why shouldn't a rational agent 
reject both bets in this scenario, given that rational agents can in general exhibit unstable betting 
behaviour? Thus merely stipulating that rational agents have sharp probabilities is not an adequate 
response to the two-bets scenario, if having sharp probabilities does not place any particular 
restriction on an agent's betting behaviour.  
 
Let us then turn to the second idea - that rational agents have sharp probabilities, and that this 
entails that rational agents always have stable betting behaviour. This does indeed give us a 
response to the two-bets scenario, for an agent whose betting behaviour is always stable would not 
reject both bets. I expect that this is the position that Elga is arguing for. However it is worth noting 
how radical this position is. It is obvious enough that everyone - including intelligent, sane people 
such as yourself - exhibit unstable betting behaviour.22 I have argued that unstable betting behaviour 
is a typical mark of those common cases where intuitively we think that an agent's probability 
function is not sharp. Elga's claim is that only irrational agents exhibit this sort of behaviour - and so 
it follows that we are all irrational in virtue of this behaviour. This is a counterintuitive claim - it is a 
mass 'irrationality theory', as unappealing as many maligned error theories. A natural way to try to 
soften the blow is to claim that 'irrationality' here is meant in some sort of technical sense. The idea 
is not that we are all just being stupid: rather, we are merely falling short of some notion of ideal 
rationally. The claim that we are not perfectly rational is something that Bayesians have long got 
used to. And of course Elga can coherently claim that an ideally rational agent will not exhibit 
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 Indeed, we exhibit unstable betting behaviour across bets of the form D for a range of values v: see footnote 
20. 
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unstable betting behaviour, and thus will not reject both bets offered in the two-bets scenario. The 
problem is that this does not explain why you would not reject both bets offered in the two-bets 
scenario. For recall that in the two-bets scenario we did not need to switch to some technical notion 
of ideal rationality to establish that it would be irrational to reject both bets. It's just an obviously 
stupid thing to do, and not something that you would do: it's irrational in the everyday sense. To 
argue that an ideally rational agent never exhibits unstable betting behaviour and therefore would 
not reject both bets does not account for the fact that you, and in general agents who are rational in 
the everyday sense would also not reject both bets. If Elga's claim that rational agents have sharp 
probabilities - and so have stable betting behaviour - is supposed to explain why it is irrational in the 
everyday sense to reject both bets, then the sense of 'rationality' had better be the same 
throughout. Thus the claim would need to be that all agents who are rational in the everyday sense 
have sharp probabilities, and so exhibit only stable betting behaviour. As we are surrounded by 
unstable betting behaviour and exhibit it ourselves, this claim would commit us to the radical view 
that irrationality is all around us where we had never suspected it - and not just technical 
irrationality either, but good old-fashioned stupidity. 
 
Section 7: Conclusion 
 
The two-bets argument is a challenge to the advocate of imprecise probabilities. I have strengthened 
this challenge, in the light of my claim that unstable betting behaviour is a typical mark of the cases 
that motivate imprecise probability theorists. A range of popular recent responses to the argument 
do not succeed against this strengthened version, and we are left with the sequence proposal and 
the planning proposal as serious contenders. A cost of accepting either of these proposals is the 
difficulty of handling the problems that Elga raises against them. Elga's own response to the scenario 
comes with its own cost: it entails mass irrationality of the everyday sort. There is no easy solution, 
then, to the two-bets argument.  
 
 
  
22 
 
Bibliography 
 
Arrow, K. J., & Hurwicz, L. (1972). An optimality criterion for decision making under ignorance. In C. 
F. Carter, & J. L. Ford, Uncertainty and Expectations in Economics: Essays in Honour of G.L.S. Shackle. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Bradley, R. (2009). Revising Incomplete Attitudes. Synthese , 171 (2), 235-256. 
Bradley, S., & Steele, K. (2014). Should Subjective Probabilities be Sharp? Episteme , 11 (3), 277-289. 
Bratman, M. (2012). Time, Rationality and Self-Governance. Philosophical Issues , 22 (1), 73-88. 
Chandler, J. (2014). Subjective Probabilities Need not be Sharp. Erkenntnis , 79 (6), 1273-1286. 
Elga, A. (2012). Errata for Subjective probabilities should be sharp. 
http://www.princeton.edu/~adame/papers/sharp/sharp-errata.pdf , 1-3. 
Elga, A. (2010). Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp. Philosophers' Imprint , 10 (5), 1-11. 
Ellsberg, D. (1961). Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics , 75 
(4), 643-669. 
Gärdenfors, P., & Sahlin, N.-E. (1982). Unreliable probabilities, risk taking and decision making. 
Synthese , 53, 361-386. 
Gauthier, D. (1986). Morals By Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Hammond, P. (1988). Orderly Decision Theory. Economics and Philosophy , 4, 292–297. 
Jeffrey, R. (1983). Bayesianism With a Human Face. In J. (. Earman, Testing Scientific Theories.  
Joyce, J. (2011). A Defense of Imprecise Credences in Inference and Decision Making. Philosophical 
Perspectives , 24 (1), 281-323. 
Levi, I. (1991). Consequentialism and sequential choice. In M. Bacharach, & S. Hurley, Foundations of 
Decision Theory. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Levi, I. (1974). On Indeterminate Probabilities. Journal of Philosophy , 71, 391-418. 
McClenen, F. (1990). Rationality and Dynamic Choice: Foundational Explorations. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Moss, S. (2014). Credal Dilemmas. Noûs . 
Ramsey, F. (1926). Truth and Probability. In F. Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics and other 
Logical Essays (pp. 156-198). New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 
Sahlin, N.-E., & Weirich, P. (2012). Unsharp sharpness. Manuscript . 
Satia, J., & Lave, R. (1973). Markovian decision processes with uncertain transition. Operations 
Research , 21 (3), 728-740. 
Seidenfeld, T. (1988). Decision theory without “independence” or without “ordering”. Economics 
and Philosophy , 4, 267-290. 
van Fraassen, B. (1990). Figures in a Probability Landscape. In J. &. Dunn, Truth or Consequences: 
Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap (pp. 345-356). 
Weatherson, B. (2008). Decision Making with Imprecise Probabilities. Manuscript . 
Weisberg, J. (2015). You've come a long way, Bayesians. Journal of Philosophical Logic , 1-18. 
Williams, R. (2014). Decision-Making Under Indeterminacy. Philosophers' Imprint , 14 (4). 
Williamson, T. (1994). Vagueness (Vol. 101). Routledge. 
 
